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REGULATING MEDICAL PSYCHOTHERAPISTS
IN ILLINOIS: A QUESTION OF BALANCE
INTRODUCTION

Vocational regulation by the state is the price paid by professionals whose business is affected with a public interest.'
The greater the impact that an occupational group has on society through the normal exercise of its specialty, the greater the
need for the group to be privileged, 2 and the specialty to be regulated by the state. 3 Society has traditionally sought to inhibit
professional dereliction by three methods: the state's licensing
or certification process, the self-regulatory action of professional
associations, and the always present threat of malpractice
suits. 4 Each of these measures performs its prophylactic function of preventing harm to the public with varying degrees of
success depending on the group to be regulated and the danger
to be avoided. It follows that where one of these measures
proves to be less than fully effective, the other two must be
made more capable of shouldering the additional burden if a
balanced protection is to be achieved.
1. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (property becomes clothed with
a public interest when used in such a manner as to make it of significant
public consequence). As a general rule, the state has plenary power to regulate any enterprise, professional or otherwise, in order to promote the general welfare, as long as the means used are reasonably adapted to
accomplish a legitimate goal. People v. Witte, 315 Ill. 282, 146 N.E. 178 (1924)
(state regulation of physicians and surgeons); People v. Elerding, 254 Ill.
579, 98 N.E. 982 (1912) (regulation of hours for female employees); Landberg
v. Chicago, 237 Ill. 112, 86 N.E. 638 (1908) (restrictions on the collection, shipping, and sale of manure). According to one author, the balance is struck

with the recognition that "every individual [has] the right to select his own

calling, subject only to certain regulations for the protection of the public
interest." Graves, Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 13 TEMP.
L.Q. 334, 336 (1939).
2. An occupational group is "privileged" when persons deficient in the
requisite skills and learning are denied an opportunity to pursue that occupation. See People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N.E. 809 (1921) (minimum standards for physicians and surgeons).

3. It has been suggested that, apart from the matter of protecting society from harm at the hands of incompetent professionals, the need to protect individual market participants from excessive competition provides an
economic rationale for specialty regulation. See Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-California, A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 640 (1966). In light of this economic model of specialty regulation, it is
interesting to note that acceptance of a fee for services rendered is a primary vehicle for determining the applicability of certain statutes regulating
health services. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5302(5) (1977) (applicability of the Psychologist Registration Act).
4. Langsley, Peer Review: Prospects and Problems, 130 Am. J. PsycmATRY 301, 302 (1973).
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Psychiatrists 5 are among the professional groups to which
this protective triad is applicable. 6 However, the protection afforded is marginal when the threat to be guarded against is negligent 7 psychotherapy. 8 The "social engineering" 9 function of
tort liability is especially inadequate to protect the public from
the negligent practice of psychotherapy, because, given the nebulous nature of the psychotherapeutic process, a standard of
care is all but impossible to define. 10 In addition, uncertainty
within the discipline makes the likelihood of establishing proximate causation minimal." When combined with the problems
inherent in assessing non-physical damages,' 2 it is not surprising that as late as 1965, no psychiatrist had been found liable by
an American appellate court for the negligent practice of psy3
chotherapy.
What was an absence of litigation in 1965 is now a "curious
5. A "psychiatrist" is a physician who specializes in psychiatry, or
"that branch of medicine which deals with the study, treatment, and prevention of mental illness." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1281 (25th ed. 1974). For purposes of this paper, the terms "psychiatrist,"
"psychotherapist," and "therapist" are used interchangably.
6. Speaking of the need to prevent negligent psychotherapy, the trial
judge in Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257, 258, affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961),
noted that "[a] psychiatrist [has] explosive forces under his control and if a
mistake [is] made the consequences might be disastrous and irrevocable."
7. "Negligent psychotherapy" is defined as "[t]he liability of the psychiatrist to his patient. . . for the breach of a duty to the patient to bring to
their relationship the skill and care of a professionally qualified psychiatrist
practicing in that community." Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists,
1966 DUKE L.J. 696, 700-01 [hereinafter cited as Dawidoff]. See also notes 39101 and accompanying text infra.
8. "Psychotherapy" is defined as:
[a] method or system of alleviating or curing certain forms of disease,
particularly diseases of the nervous system or such as are traceable to
nervous disorders by suggestion, persuasion, encouragement, the inspiration of hope or confidence, the discouragement of morbid memories,
associations, or beliefs, and other similar means addressed to the
mental state of the patient, without (or sometimes in conjunction with)
the administration of drugs or other physical remedies.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1392 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
Psychotherapeutic treatment is "designed to produce a response by
mental rather than by physical effects, including the use of suggestion, persuasion, reeducation, reassurance, and support, as well as the techniques of
hypnosis, abreaction, and psychoanalysis which are employed in the socalled deep psychotherapy." DomRAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1284 (25th ed. 1974). See also notes 23-28 and accompanying text infra. For a
thorough discussion of a psychiatrist's liability for negligence in the use of
chemical or mechanical therapy see Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599 (1965).
9. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 14 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].

10.
11.
12.
13.

See notes
See notes
See notes
Annot., 99

118-27 and accompanying text infra.
128-34 and accompanying text infra.
135-40 and accompanying text infra.
A.L.R.2d 599, 620 (1965).
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scarcity" of cases dealing with the liability of psychiatrists 14 for
negligent psychotherapy. Despite the sharp rise of medical malpractice suits generally, 15 in only one American appellate court
case has a psychiatrist been held liable for negligent psychotherapy. 16 There are several plausible explanations for the scarcity of case law on the subject. One theory is that psychiatrists
are especially well-trained to deal with the negative feelings of
their patients and, as such, are able to deflect the hostility which
serves as the driving force in many malpractice actions.' 7 Another possibility is that there has been no negligent practice of
psychotherapy. This theory seems unlikely, however, and was
rejected by a Michigan Supreme Court Justice who commented
individuals
that "[a]ll professions . . . contain unscrupulous
8
who use their position to injure others."'
Various authors have intimated another explanation-that
traditional tort theory renders the successful prosecution of a
suit for negligent psychotherapy a functional improbability. 19
Central to their thesis is the contention that the lack of litigation
in this area is due to the uniqueness of psychotherapy and the
resulting conceptual difficulty in defining the duties that should
14. If it is true that "anyone engaging in psychotherapy is subject to
the same duties and liabilities," Tarshis, Liabilityfor Psychotherapy, 30
FACULTY L. REV. 75, 75 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tarshis], then a clinical

psychologist, "a doctorate, other than medical, who specializes in the
mental phenomena of consciousness and behavior or mental activity," Appleton, PsychotherapistPrescribesa Drug in His Office: Medicolegal Risks,

1970 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 207, 209, is exposed to the same legal risks for his
negligent practice.
15. See, e.g., Brooke, Medical Malpractice:A Socio-Economic Problem
(wherein author
reports a 43% increase over a five-year period). See also Sandor, The His-

from a Doctor's View, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 225, 227 (1970)

tory of ProfessionalLiability Suits in the United States, 163 J.A.M.A. 459
(1957).
16. Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1969) (psychiatrist held liable for a gross breach of his fiduciary duties by intentional mismanagement
of the transfer phenomenon).

In Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1976), the plaintiff

brought an action against her psychiatrist, alleging that he adversely affected her mental and emotional status by engaging in sexual intercourse
with her over a period of 13 months as part of her prescribed treatment. The
majority based the defendant's liability on his failure to treat the plaintiff
with professionally acceptable procedures.
17. See Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of
Psychiatry, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 401 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Heller].

18. Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 135, 191 N.W.2d 355, 363 (1971)
(suit by patient against psychiatrist for false imprisonment, assault and
battery, and malpractice).
19. See Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 696; Tarshis, supra note 14, at 75;
Comment, Medical Malpractice: The Liability of Psychiatrists,48 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 693 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Medical Malpractice]; Comment, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist,8 U.S.F. 405 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Tort Liability].
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be required of the therapist. These authors report that in the
few cases where liability has been imposed, the courts have
been able to formulate standards which delineate only the ex20
tremes of acceptable psychotherapeutic practice.
If the negligence standard is impossible to implement effectively, other existing sources of control over the psychiatrist
who practices psychotherapy must be re-evaluated in light of
the unavailability of a tort alternative. The importance of this reevaluation becomes apparent in view of the number of patients
who are likely candidates for psychotherapeutic treatment. One
out of every twelve Americans will be hospitalized for mental
illness during his lifetime, while, at the present time, more than
one-half of our hospital beds are occupied by patients suffering
from mental illness. 2 1 It has been estimated that 16% of all
Americans suffer from some form of mental disability with
15,000,000 affected by serious personality disturbances. 22 Many,
presumably, undergo psychotherapy.
To understand why the tort sanction ineffectively deters
negligent psychotherapy, one must first become familiar with
the nature of the relationship that exists between the psychotherapist and his patient, for it is the negligent manipulation of
this relationship that serves as a basis for liability in the cases
that will be examined. Yet the cases are few in number; it will
therefore be necessary to depict how a psychotherapist might be
negligent by means of analogies drawn from other medical specialities. After the tort alternative and its inadequacies are discussed, the sources and shortcomings of regulatory control over
psychiatrists who practice psychotherapy in Illinois will be examined, and reform measures will be suggested.
THE NATURE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: ITS USE AND ABUSE

Nature of the Practice
Just as the relationship between a physician and his patient
is based on a fiduciary trust, so is the relationship between the
therapist and his patient. 23 Although both relationships are
grounded in confidence, the respective roles played by physician and psychotherapist during the course of the healing process differ considerably. Should a patient have a personal dislike
for the surgeon who will operate on his broken leg, the friction
between the two will not likely interfere with the doctor's func20. See cases cited in note 150 infra.
21. N. KrrrRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 54-55 (1971).

22. Id.
23. Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 702-03; Tarshis, supra note 14, at 88.
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tion nor the patient's recovery. In the case of psychotherapy, on
the other hand, the relationship between the patient and his
therapist is of critical importance since "[t] he relationship is the
medium for treatment and (one hopes) cure. ' 24 In this respect,
the practice of psychotherapy is unlike any other medical specialty, and as such, demands special attention.
Donald J. Dawidoff was perhaps the first legal scholar to
note the importance of this relationship on the entire psychotherapeutic process:
Central to psychotherapeutic treatment is the establishment of a
relationship with the psychiatrist to which the patient can bring
past experience and emotions, and in which he can establish the
model for a new method of dealing with his environment. Through
the establishment of a transference with the psychiatrist, the patient reacts towards him with the emotional responses he had
learned and used with his parents and siblings, thus experiencing
again the emotions of the past. Through such a reliving, and the
interpretation of the experience, the patient learns to understand
his reactive patterns and through them to grow to new and more
mature behavior. The center of the growth is often an identification
with the therapist, where the patient sees in the therapist the imand comes to make healthy patterns of
age of the healthy2person,
5
response his own.
Thus, the relationship between the therapist and his patient is
as necessary as and equivalent to the hands of the hypothetical
leg. Without the
surgeon who operates on his patient's broken
26
therapy.
effective
no
is
there
relationship,
Non-involvement on the part of the patient will prevent the
development of this necessary relationship. In other words, the
patient must try to interact with his therapist for the therapy to
have any success. Although the psychiatrist brings to this relationship a professional expertise for which the patient is expected to pay, the bond between the parties is not unlike a close
friendship. 27 In essence, then, the psychiatrist is "agreeing to
provide a situation, the psychotherapeutic situation-a secluded
environment, a readiness to listen and talk to the patient, and to
allow a relationship to develop. '28 It is through this relationship that treatment is offered to the patient.
The treatment offered will depend on the nature of the problem and the professional orientation of the psychiatrist. The pa24. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 78.
25. Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 697-98.

26. Unless the patient can form a trusting relationship with the psychiatrist, psychotherapy becomes an "ineffective and intellectual exercise."
Heller, supra note 17, at 406.

27. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 78.
28. Id. at 80.
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tient's illness may range from schizophrenia to a mild, transient
neurosis. 29 If the psychotherapist is of the somatotherapeutic
orientation, 30 he may offer some variety of drug therapy. If he
ascribes to the sociotherapeutic view, 3 1 supportive therapy may
be employed. 32 Practitioners of the behavior modification
school 33 may try to "re-educate" 34 their patients, while those
who maintain a psychotherapeutic view 35 will make use of the
more aggressive reconstructive therapy. 36 Some therapists
make use of all of these approaches, or some combination of
those applicable in a given situation.37 No matter what the approach, however, the goal is the same: to allow the patient to live
38
a more healthy and productive life.

The Case Law
39

Landau v. Werner, an English decision, is the leading
case 40 concerning the negligent practice of psychotherapy. In
Landau, the plaintiff was referred to the defendant psychiatrist
by her physician because of acute symptoms of anxiety neurosis. Due to the transference phenomenon 41 that arose during the
29. Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 697.
30. Proponents of this orientation maintain that certain forms of aberrant behavior are caused by organic malfunctions. See Medical Malpractice,
supra note 19, at 697 n.35.
31. Advocates of this view suggest that aberrant behavior is the result
of "problems in living." Id. at 697 n.36.
32. Supportive therapy is used to strengthen existing psychic defenses
to better enable the patient to cope with his environment. See Tarshis,
supra note 14, at 79.
33. Rather than seeking the cause of the aberrant behavior, the advocate of this school will help the patient "extinguish" the behavior itself. See
Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 697 n.37.
34. Re-educative therapy does not seek to re-build the patient's psyche,
but rather aims to "re-condition" his behavior. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 79.
35. This is the most traditional of the approaches, and its use is
thought to enable the therapist to uncover the actual cause of the aberrant
behavior. See Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 696 n.34.
36. The aim of this type of therapy is a general alteration of the patient's personality. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 79.
37. Id.
38. Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 704.
39. 105 Sol. J. 257, affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961).
40. Apart from being the leading case, it was for some time the only
case in the area of negligent psychotherapy. See text accompanying note 13
supra.
41. Defined as "[tihe shifting of an effect from one person to another
or from one idea to another, especially the transfer by the patient to the
analyst of emotional tones, either of affection or of hostility, based on unconscious identification," DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY

1630 (25th ed. 1974), transference results from the psychiatrist's manipulation of the psychotherapeutic relationship in order to achieve certain
mental states in his patient. See generally Tarshis, supra note 14, at 78.
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course of her treatment, the plaintiff fell in love with the defendant. After a few months, the plaintiff began feeling better and
the treatment was ended. What followed can best be described
as a "series of social contacts" 42 between the parties which
lasted approximately six months and which, according to the defendant, constituted the most therapeutic way to disengage from
their professional association. When the defendant sought to
terminate these social encounters altogether, the plaintiff attempted suicide and never fully recovered from her worsened
43
mental condition.
Liability in Landau was based on the social contacts which
were introduced by the defendant psychiatrist. Although the defendant was acquitted of having sexual relations with his patient and absolved of anything which could be regarded as
professional misconduct or unethical practice, 44 the English
court noted that there was not a body of opinion which would
have thought it desirable to take out a woman in a highly emotional state and already in love with the doctor.45 Cognizant of
the uncertainty within the science, the appellate court ruled that
although "a doctor might not be negligent if he tried a new
'46
technique ... he must justify it before the court.
Lack of justification for use of a rather novel technique led
an American court to impose liability for conduct that bordered
on assault and battery. In Hammer v. Rosen,47 while various theories to support liability were alleged on appeal, 48 the court
found evidence that physical beatings which were used to treat
schizophrenia constituted a prima facie case of malpractice,
and, unless justified, would result in judgment against the psychiatrist. 49 By shifting the burden of proving reasonable care to
42. Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 620 (1965).
43. Plaintiff's £6000 award was based on her inability to work after the

traumatic experience for which Dr. Werner was held to have been responsible. Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257, affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961).
44. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 85; Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 620 (1965).

45. Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257, 258, aff'd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961).
46. Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 1008, aff'g, 105 Sol. J. 257 (1961).
47. 7 App. Div. 2d 216, 181 N.Y.S. 805 (1959), modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165
N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
48. (Specifically, malpractice, breach of contract, and fraud). 7 N.Y.2d
376, 379, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1960).

49. Speaking to the appropriateness of such "physical therapy," the appellate court held that "the very nature of the acts complained of bespeaks
improper treatment and malpractice and that if the defendant chooses to
justify those acts as proper treatment, he is under the necessity of offering
evidence to that effect." 7 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65,
67 (1960).
In Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1969), a physician's insur-

ance company argued unsuccessfully that its insured was acting outside the
scope of the malpractice policy coverage when he intentionally mishandled
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the therapist, the plaintiff was able to sustain her case without
50
the use of expert testimony.
Other reported instances of professional misconduct in the
course of the psychotherapeutic process have been disposed of
either by statute 51 or through settlement, 52 and it is "not possible" to get information about unprofessional conduct that is

brought to the attention of the American Psychiatric Associa5 3
tion because all such cases are "handled confidentially."
Therefore, it is necessary to analogize from the general doctorpatient relationship to illustrate the various forms of malpractice in a psychotherapeutic setting.
the transference phenomenon in a calculated effort to defraud the plaintiff
out of her savings and her honor. However, the issue in the case was one of
coverage, and did not concern the standard of care for the practice of psychotherapy. But see Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1976)
(psychiatrist who had engaged in sexual intercourse with his patient held
liable for his failure to use professionally acceptable procedures).
50. See generally PRossER, supra note 9, at 227.
51. In Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968), the
plaintiff sued a psychiatrist who was "intimately" treating his wife, but the
court summarily dismissed the complaint for criminal conversation and
alienation of affections, the actions having been abolished by statute. But
see Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1976) (wherein the
court held that an action against a psychiatrist based on allegations that the
psychiatrist had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff as part of her therapy
was not barred by legislation eliminating actions for seduction).
A case brought by a drug-addict patient against his former psychiatrist
for mismanagement of the transference phenomenon was resolved against
the defendant, but the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining liability was
based on a violation of an anti-narcotics statute. Rosenfeld v. Coleman, 19
Pa. D. & C.2d 635, 35 North Co. R. 206 (1959), cited in Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599,
606-07 n.20 (1965). This is not to say, however, that the same result could not
be achieved by means of a malpractice action. See King v. Solomon, 323
Mass. 326, 81 N.E.2d 838 (1948) (physician liable in malpractice for his patient's morphine addiction).
52. Lawsuits are expensive, time-consuming, and often produce adverse publicity that can jeopardize a physician's medical practice. Doubtless these considerations influenced the psychiatrist in the following
unreported case:
A dapper 32-year-old psychiatrist was sued by his patient, a young
woman of 24, after more than two years of intensive psychotherapy. The
allegation: "improper medical care, treatment, acts and conduct resulting in permanent mental injuries." She testified that his conduct toward her while she was ill made her "more upset and nervous." The
doctor said she was "lonely and frightened .... I helped her, brought
her various gifts, let her do routine work in the office and helped her
find an apartment." He denied dates or sexual involvement. He had
trouble finding his records and asked the insurance company to settle
promptly and at any cost. They did. The settlement cost $3,500 plus legal fees.
Slawson, Psychiatric Malpractice:A Regional Incidence Study, 126 Am.J.
PSYCHIATRY

1302, 1305 (1970).

53. Letter from Henry H. Work, Deputy Medical Director, American
Psychiatric Association, to Michael J. Karson (February 11, 1975).
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Beyond The Cases
Malpractice suits involving psychiatrists are rare,M and, as
reported, actions grounded on the negligence of a psychotherapist are all but non-existent.55 As a result, depicting how a
patient undergoing psychotherapy might incur compensable
56
damage at the hands of a negligent psychiatrist is difficult.
This is not to say, however, that there are no theoretical constructs into which instances of psychotherapeutic malpractice
can be placed. The categories below represent phases of the
physician-patient relationship during which a psychiatrist might
later be held to have acted negligently.5 7 In each instance, the
failure to cure or
basis for liability would be the psychiatrist's
58
the worsening of the patient's condition.
Pre-DiagnosticNegligence
Not unlike other medical specialists, psychotherapists can
be negligent in their selection of prospective patients. 59 Thus,
the newly-licensed psychiatrist would be ill-advised to begin
psychotherapeutic treatment of a severely troubled patient who
0
would be better served by an experienced specialist.6 In this
regard, ignorance of or disregard for the psychiatrist's profes61
sional limitations could provide the foundation for litigation.
Unique to psychiatrists is the way in which personalities
can operate as a limitation on the types of patients the psychia54. See generally Medical Malpractice, supra note 19, at 694.

55. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
56. See Tarshis, supra note 14, at 96, where the author suggests that
the "development of legal theory" in this area has been restricted in part

because "the conceptual tools (of the science) are underdeveloped."
57. See generally Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 700-11; Tarshis, supra note
14, at 82-92; Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 704-06; Tort Liability,

supra note 19, at 411-14.

58. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 75; Tort Liability,supra note 19, at 411. Of

course, negligent treatment is not necessarily established by proving a failure to recover or a worsening of the patient's mental condition. See notes
130, 131 infra.

59. When a physician takes a case, he represents that he has profes-

sional learning and skill common to similarly situated practitioners and

that he will exercise reasonable care in the application of those skills to his
patient's case. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967); Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963).
60. If the patient's condition requires the services of a specialist, the

physician has a duty to advise his patient accordingly and to make the referral. See, e.g., King v. Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1969).
61. In addition, "[r]egardless of his legal obligation, a professional man
demonstrates a high degree of ethical conduct by recognizing the limitations upon his own ability and by associating with ... or referring the patient to, a man more skilled in the treatment of the particular ailment." J.
MIRZA & J. APPLEMAN, ILLINOIS TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 314 (1974).
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trist can treat.6 2 If the therapist has consistently been unable to
develop an effective working relationship with persons exhibiting certain personality patterns, it would be necessary for him to
refuse to treat persons with those personality traits.63 Should he
direct the patient to another specialist with the same limitation,
a duty to avoid negligent referrals would be breached. 64
DiagnosticNegligence
Improper diagnosis is a common source of medical malpractice. 65 In the case of a psychiatrist engaged in the practice of
psychotherapy, the problem is twofold. It first must be determined whether the patient is suffering from a physical or mental
disorder. 66 Secondly, if the psychiatrist determines that the
problem is mental, the proper diagnostic category must be
found. 67 Even when the therapist has determined that "symptom treatment" 68 is the most prudent course of treatment, basic
69
diagnostic determinations would still be in order.
Misdiagnosis may be the result of the psychiatrist's failure
to consult. 70 Although similar to the physician's disregard for his
62. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
63. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 79, 85.
64. See, e.g., Strum v. Green, 398 P.2d 799 (Okla. 1965) (liability predicated on defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care in selecting a substitute physician).
65. See, e.g., Huff v. Condell Memorial Hosp., 4 Ill. App. 3d 352, 280
N.E.2d 495 (1972) (improper diagnosis due to inadequate number of x-rays);
Pugh v. Swiontek, 115 Ill.
App. 2d 26, 253 N.E.2d 3 (1969) (failure to diagnose
complications during pregnancy).
Some courts have found the diagnosis of organic disease to be an inexact science (because accuracy depends on information supplied by the patient) and have therefore applied a less rigid standard in affixing liability
for misdiagnosis. Note, An Evaluationof Changes in the Medical Standard
of Care, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729, 749 (1970). Yet, because the psychotherapeutic process is even more inexact, "the diagnosis is not given to the level of
precision expected in other fields." Tarshis, supra note 14, at 78.
66. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 79.
67. This basic determination can prove to be difficult because there are
"several hundred categories of adult psychopathology" from which the physician may select. Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 699. Perhaps as a
result, psychiatric diagnosis has been labeled "unreliable" and deserving of
"very serious question when classifying, treating, and studying patients' behavior and outcomes." Pasamanick, Dinitz &Lefton, PsychiatricOrientation
and Its Relation to Diagnosisand Treatment in a Mental Hospital, 116 Am.
J. PSYCHIATRY 127 (1959).

68. Practitioners of the behavior modification school, see notes 33-34
and accompanying text supra, simply treat their patients' symptoms rather
than probe for the underlying cause of the symptoms.
69.

See generally B. FIcARRA, SURGICAL AND ALLIED MALPRACTICE 29

(1968) (basic diagnostic procedures outlined).
70. Senseris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (breach of this
duty must be shown by expert testimony).
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professional limitations when accepting a new case, 71 it is suggested that a greater duty to the patient exists after a fiduciary
relationship has been established. 72 Since the duties of proper
diagnosis and consultation when necessary are ones that continue throughout the psychotherapeutic process, the therapist
could be negligent in failing to re-evaluate the original diagnosis,
or in failing to consult when a re-evaluation has been under73
taken.
Negligent Treatment
Once the psychiatrist correctly "labels" his patient's illness,
he is ready to plan the treatment strategy. 74 The first step in this
process in which the therapist might be negligent is in his choice
of treatment, 75 since certain types of therapy are wholly inappropriate for persons with certain personality traits. For example, the patient with a fragile psyche who could probably be
helped with supportive therapy 76 might be devastated by a reconstructive approach. 77 To "reconstruct" a patient exhibiting
only mild, transient neurotic symptoms might be to negligently
prolong his treatment.
After the choice of treatment has been made, the psychiatrist is confronted with the question of how fully to inform his
patient about the decision. 78 The dilemma is difficult because
71. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
72. It is not until the physician accepts a case that the fiduciary rela-

tionship is created and representations of competency are made. See notes
23, 59 and accompanying text supra.
73. If, after a reasonable amount of time, the patient shows no signs of
progress, the physician has a duty to investigate the nature of the problem

and to take steps to rectify it. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 88.
74. Some courts have held the diagnostic stage to be a part of the treatment. See, e.g., Ries v. Reinard, 47 Cal. App. 2d 116, 117 P.2d 386 (1941);

Welsh v. Frisbee Memorial Hosp., 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939).
The treatment strategy might entail nothing more than some advice on
how to handle a domestic problem. For example, if a psychiatrist were to
identify his patient's depression with the habitual nagging of his recently
arrived mother-in-law, he might recommend ways to facilitate her early departure. Should the patient's wife bring suit for divorce because of her
mother's eviction from the homestead, an action by the patient against the
psychiatrist for negligent advice might be pursued, although it is doubtful
that liability would be imposed on the basis of inaccurate advice that is

otherwise reasonable. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 95.
75. See notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra. Showing negligence
in choice of treatment will be especially difficult, given both the inherently
nebulous nature of the psychotherapeutic process, see notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra, and the number of respected minorities that have
evolved as a result of discord within the discipline. See Tort Liability,supra
note 19, at 49.
76. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
77. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 85.
78. The doctrine of informed consent requires that the attending physi-
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the psychotherapist is forced to balance his duty to protect the
patient from counterproductive distress against his patient's
79
right to full and complete information about the treatment.
Since the patient's mental condition may inhibit his propensity
to question the therapist about the treatment, 80 the balance is
delicate at best. And, of course, the duty to disclose is a continuing one which becomes more compelling as the therapy
strengthens the patient's tolerance for "bearing" the prognosis 8 1
Another balance that may prove difficult for the psychiatrist
to maintain is that between detachment and diligence. The therapist must remain somewhat distant from his patient if he is to
maintain the objectivity that is critical to a successful resolution
of the patient's problem. 82 For example, by encouraging social
cian disclose to the patient the risks incident to the treatment so as to enable the patient to decide whether he should accept the treatment. E.g.,
Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906). The legal sufficiency of the
information provided by the physician must be proven by expert testimony.
Green v. Hussey, 127 Ill. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156 (1970).
Lack of informed consent by a patient to certain kinds of physical therapy may result in an actionable violation of his bodily integrity. Paulsen v.
Gendersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935). However, the courts have been
hesitant in allowing recovery for interference solely with a person's peace
of mind, particularly when such interference was the result of the defendant's negligent conduct. See PROSSER, supra note 9, at 327. Thus, a court
might be reluctant to hold that a physician who was guilty of unauthorized
psychotherapy was liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
79. As noted in Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 109-10, 191 N.E.2d
436, 443 (1963), "the physician cannot, and should not, so terrify the patient
by pointing out to him the manifest dangers which are present at any time
the slightest surgical operation is performed. To do so might present a
psychic reaction which would seriously retard the success of the physician's treatment." Therefore, if a detailed explanation of the patient's illness would worsen his condition or impede further progress, full disclosure
might itself be negligent. See Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967). However, a psychotherapist is not
justified in withholding from his patient pertinent information concerning
the treatment simply because the patient would elect to forego therapy if
full disclosure was made. Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 703. See
also Smith, TherapeuticPrivilege to Withhold Specific DiagnosisFrom Patient Sick With Serious or FatalIllnesg 19 TENN. L. REV. 349 (1946).
80. For the effect of the patient's mental condition on his willingness to
bring suit against his psychotherapist, see note 114 and accompanying text
infra.
81. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 91.
82. See Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257, affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961)
(wherein liability of psychiatrist for mishandling the transference phenomenon resulted from lack of detachment).
It is generally recognized that the therapist is best able to bring to bear
his skill on the patient's problem when he is detached from emotional involvement. Dawidoff writes that a therapist "must maintain his emotional
stability if only because without it his capacity to empathize and participate
in the therapy by infusing it with his own energy might be lost." Dawidoff,
supra note 7, at 709.
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contacts with his
sonal goals with
can be perceived
must be given to

patient, the psychiatrist may confuse his perhis professional obligations.8 3 Since affection
on a variety of different levels, consideration
the possibility of a patient's distorted percep-

84
tion of an otherwise neutral act.

There is also a duty of diligence that the therapist must
meet.85 This duty will necessarily be fulfilled if the psychiatrist
is to inspire the confidence of his patient that is essential to a
healthy psychotherapeutic relationship.8 6 However, apart from
the basic attention necessary to maintain the relationship, 8 a7
therapist may have a duty to be available during a crisis.
Should the patient's worsened condition be traced to a lack of
care at this time, the therapist can be held responsible.8 8
An extension of the psychotherapist's duty to be diligent is
a duty to monitor his patient's activity. This supervision may be
incident to the treatment itself and as such, might require only
83. In Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257, 258, affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961),
the trial court noted that it was highly undesirable for a psychiatrist to interact socially with an unstable patient who was already very much in love
with him and, as such, was in a highly suggestive state. One author suggests
that "there is professional medical opinion to the effect that, in the transference relationship, it is not possible clearly to separate social and professional conduct." Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 704-05. Of course, the propensity
of a therapist to become emotionally involved with certain personality
types must be recognized at the time he accepts the patient's case. See
notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
84. However, a psychiatrist is not bound to remain emotionally flat
when treating his patients. "His every action need not be drive reduced and
free of neurotic motive, nor need it be uniformly recognized or accepted as
drive reduced by the psychiatric community." Dawidoff, supra note 7, at
709. Indeed, without some psychological involvement on the part of the
therapist, it is doubtful that the requisite relationship-the medium for
cure-could develop between the physician and patient. See notes 23-28 and
accompanying text supra.Yet to contend that the "standard practice of the
medical profession" must guide the point at which a therapist is held liable
for failure to control his own feelings, Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 710-11, is to
presuppose that a single standard of care is available. But see note 124 and
accompanying text infra.
85. Church v. Adler, 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327 (1953) (a doctor has
a duty to treat his patient as long as treatment is required).
86. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
87. It is important to determine whether the therapist has contracted
to be available only for scheduled appointments or whether he has contracted to treat a disease, an obligation which may not be accommodated by
an inflexible appointment schedule. Both views are represented in practice,
see Tarshis, supra note 14, at 87, and are subject to prior agreement between the particular parties. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1958).
88. Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1963) (physician cannot
leave patient at critical stage without giving reasonable notice or making
arrangements for a qualified substitute). In this regard, the duty of care
should be strictly construed for if the lack of diligence destroys the patient's
basic sense of trust, another psychotherapist may not be able to "pick up
where the last left off." Tarshis, supra note 14, at 88.
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that the patient make a regular report of his emotional response
to certain of life's events. An extreme would be the requirement
of institutional supervision when the patient's violent behavior
poses a threat to himself,89 or others. 90 While suicide is difficult
to predict, 9 1 a therapist might be liable for disregarding evidence
92
of his patient's violent tendencies.
The converse of the psychiatrist's obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in caring for his patient is his duty to terminate the physician-patient relationship when treatment is no
longer required or when it ceases to be effective. In both instances the therapist must determine to what degree the treatment has been successful. If the patient is "cured," there is no
need for further treatment. 93 If nothing more can be done by the
psychiatrist to help the patient, there is no reason to continue
the relationship. 94 In either case, continuing a course of unnecessary treatment could render the psychiatrist liable for malpractice. 95 Yet if the therapist is in error about the success of the
treatment or underestimates his own ability to offer additional
help to the patient, he may be negligent in discharging him prematurely. 96 Where there is reasonable doubt about the patient's
"cure" or the utility of the therapist's role, the psychiatrist might
be held liable for failing to consult with another specialist if the
89. Suicide among patients in therapy is not uncommon, Litman, When

Patients Commit Suicide, 19 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 570, 572 (1965), and
ranks as a major cause of death generally. See Peer, Liability of Hospital
and Psychiatristin Suicide, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 631 (1965). See generally
Tort Liability,supra note 19, at 422.
90. Apart from his duty to supervise a potentially dangerous patient,
the psychotherapist may now have a duty to warn an endangered victim
whose peril was disclosed during a privileged communication between the
therapist and patient. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 33 Cal.
App. 3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1973). See generally Tort Liability, supra
note 19, at 425.
91. Perr, Suicide Responsibility of Hospital and Psychiatrist,CLEV.MAR. L. REV. 427, 437 (1960) (even previous attempt is of little value in predicting suicidal tendencies).
92. See Tarshis, supra note 14, at 87.
93. "If treatment is no longer required, then of course the doctor has
not abandoned the patient." Tarshis, supra note 14, at 88.
94. Thus, "there may be a duty upon a psychiatrist whose continued
application has borne no visible fruit to abandon the case or seek consultation." Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 713. See note 73 and accompanying text
supra.
95. However, it may be impossible to determine whether or not the
treatment is unnecessary since there is little agreement among clinicians
when secondary diagnostic categories are employed. Medical Malpractice,
supra note 19, at 699-702. Thus, "[ijf the patient has an illness for which
there are no reliable diagnostic techniques, he cannot recover even though
he may have spent considerable amounts of time and money for the treatment of an illness which he does not, in fact have." Id. at 698.
96. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
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discharge later proves to have been premature. 97
Post-DischargeNegligence

The key to a successful psychotherapeutic process is the relationship between therapist and patient. 98 This relationship
may or may not extend beyond the "official" discharge of the
patient from treatment. If it does, a question arises over whether
the psychiatrist may be held liable to the patient or third persons for damages that result from events which occur subsequent to the discharge. Presumably, a person cannot be held
accountable for the acts of another solely on the basis of the
friendship that exists between them.99 With fiduciaries, however, a stronger case can be argued in support of some continuing obligation during the period immediately following
discharge. 00 This would be true particularly when the discharge
resulted from the patient's unilateral act which was later determined to be only a symptom of the emotional problem that first
gave rise to the consultation. 10 1

97. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
99. Prosser notes that "the law has persistently refused to recognize
the moral obligation of common decency ... to come to the aid of another
human being who is in danger," but he then lists the special relations between parties which might give rise to such affirmative duties, concluding
that there are "undoubtedly other relations [which call] for the same
[duty]." PROSSER, supra note 9, at 341.
100. The duty of a treating physician to exercise due care is not
founded in contract but rather, "is predicated by the law on the relation
which exists between physician and patient . . . ." 61 AM. JuR. 2d Physicians and Surgeons § 106 (1972) (emphasis added). Thus, where the psychological bond between the therapist and patient continues after
discharge, some duty of care might be imposed on the psychotherapist despite the gratitutous nature of the relationship. See Stevens v. Stevens, 355
Mich. 363, 370, 94 N.W.2d 858, 862 (1959), in which the court, in construing the
applicability of a guest statute, noted that:
[Ilt has been our boast that when one entrusts another with life or
property relying upon a relationship of trust and confidence, rather
than the weapons and guarantees of the business world, a performance
of duty the most exacting will be demanded, a conformity not with the
arm's length standards of the market but rather the infinitely nicer
standards of the hearth and the heart.
101. While the psychiatrist cannot force a patient to continue therapy,
he would be obligated to deal appropriately with a patient's unilateral termination of the relationship when the act was symptomatic of the psychological problem which the psychiatrist did contract to treat.Yet, there are
those who feel that the patient should nevertheless be given the responsibility of deciding whether to submit to, or discontinue treatment. Tarshis,
supra note 14, at 90.
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THE INADEQUACIES OF A TORT ALTERNATIVE

When a physician assumes to treat a patient, he represents
himself as having the skills and knowledge common to the class
of practitioners to which he belongs. 10 2 As an incident of the
physician-patient relationship, 10 3 the law imposes on the doctor
a duty to employ the requisite care 10 4 in the performance of his
professional responsibilities. If the physician lacks ordinary
skills or neglects to apply those which he does possess, he may
be liable to his injured patient in a malpractice action. 0 5 Due, in
part, to an increase in the wealth of scientific information available to plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on physicians for
negligent treatment of physical illnesses, 10 6 the number of malpractice suits against these practitioners has increased dramatically. 10 7 This influx of litigation has generated new and clearer
guidelines to the medical profession for avoiding negligent practice.
In general, the duties of care imposed on medical practition-

ers are equally applicable to psychiatrists 10 8 who, being no more
perfect than other medical specialists, 0 9 should also be vulnerable to malpractice claims. However, such has not been the case.
Instead, psychiatrists engaged in the practice of psychotherapy
102. E.g., Church v. Adler, 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327 (1953).
103. It is not required that a psychiatrist expressly represent his professional qualifications to his patient before a duty to care for him arises
since an implicit representation of competence is made by reason of the
physician holding himself out as being a member of the psychiatric community. See Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun. 282, 289, 3 N.Y.S. 338, 341 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
Where an express representation is made, the resulting contractual relationship between the parties may provide the basis for the duty. See Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968).
104. The practitioner is required to display the ordinary training and
skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same or similar communities. See, e.g., Church v. Adler, 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327
(1953).
105. While lack of the requisite knowledge or skills and negligent application of that knowledge or those skills are separate forms of malpractice,
Newport v. Hyde, 244 Miss. 870, 147 So. 2d 113 (1962), the courts occasionally
fail to make the distinction when there would be no difference in result. See,
e.g., Copeland v. Robertson, 236 Miss. 95, 112 So. 2d 236 (1959); Wilson v.
Martin Memorial Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950).
Apart from liability for malpractice, the physician may be held accountable for breach of contract. See, e.g., Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220
N.E.2d 767 (1966) (physician guaranteed sterility). But see Gault v.
Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436 (1963) (in suit for breach of specific contract, representation that operation could cure plaintiff was not a
warranty that defendant physician would cure plaintiff).
106. J. MIRZA & J. APPLEMAN, ILLINoIs TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 311
(1974).
107. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
108. See Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 619 (1965).
109. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 96.

19781

Regulating Medical Psychotherapists

have been relatively immune from suits resulting from negligent
practice. 1 0 While this lack of litigation may be due in part to the
psychiatrist's ability to displace the negative feelings of his patient and thus reduce his propensity to sue,"' it may be due primarily to the difficulty in implementing traditional tort theories
within the unique context of the psychotherapeutic relationship.
General Problems With the Tort Alternative
A malpractice action becomes a viable option for an injured
patient only after he associates the damage he suffered with the
therapy offered by the negligent psychotherapist. 11 2 This connection is tenuous at best and may be overlooked when the patient's unstable mental condition impairs his ability to reason.
Subsequent therapy might help bring to light the negligence of a
previously consulted psychiatrist and may provide the moral
support necessary for the patient to bring an action against a
former confidant; however, the patient who has been severely
traumatized by the aborted treatment may be reluctant to seek
1 3
this additional help.
Even when the patient is cognizant of his worsened mental
state and can associate that condition with the negligence of a
particular therapist, he still may be unwilling to pursue a remedy in the courts. If the patient is distrustful as a result of his
former treatment, it is unlikely that he will initiate litigation the
result of which is highly speculative. This reluctance would be
especially pronounced when the patient knows that it may be
necessary for him to bare his soul before a judge and jury whose
members are selected from his community. Moreover, while
such testimony would be essential to the successful resolution
of the patient's suit, by no means would it insure favorable results at trial since the "diseased" witness no doubt will face
credibility problems when testifying against an articulate professional whose public esteem is somewhat greater than that of
14
his former patient."
110. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
111. One author has observed that "[1litigation of this type-a patient
against his doctor-is often a product of hostility that the doctor has engendered in the patient and that has not been worked out." Tarshis, supra note
14, at 96.
112. Unless the therapist's negligence is extreme, or results in physical
injury, the association between the injury and the treatment may be impossible to make. Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 703.
113. In cases where the patient does seek additional help, the negative
feelings caused by his deteriorated sense of trust may carry over into the
new psychotherapeutic situation, thereby inhibiting further progress. See
note 88 supra.
114. In one study, physicians were ranked among the most prestigious

618

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11:601
Problems With Specific Elements of the Cause of Action

The problems involved in proving a tort case against a negligent psychiatrist can be traced directly to the nebulous nature
of the psychotherapeutic process itself.115 At times characterized as "clandestine and mystical,"' 16 the process is highly individual and, as such, defies the quantification that is necessary
for a standard of psychotherapeutic care to evolve. Thus, "[t] he
price of recognizing a cause of action for psychiatric malpractice
is some judicial ordering of psychiatric behavior." 117 It remains
to be seen whether the courts will be able (or willing) to do what
the psychiatric community itself has not yet been able to accomplish.
Defining the Duty
Actionable negligence is based on the breach of a legal
duty 1 8 of one person to exercise the requisite care for the protection of the person injured as a result of the breach. 119 The
psychiatrist's duty to protect his patient from harm arises out of
their physician-patient relationship. 1 20 Apart from the basic
duty imposed on the psychiatrist because of his professional
status, 121 the degree to which he must care for individual patients depends on the particular circumstances of their relationship. In other words, "[t]he greater the risk that a course of
of all occupational groups, second only to Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. Hodge, Siegel & Rossi, OccupationalPrestigein the United
States: 1925-1963, in CLASS, STATUS, AND POWER 324 (R. Bendix and S. Lipset
eds. 1966). Conversely, the public stigma associated with mental disease
was powerful enough to cause the resignation of the Democratic vice-presidential nominee in the 1972 national elections. One author suggests that
transference, "as well as the character of the neurosis itself, makes some
testimony of the psychiatric patients questionable." Heller, supra note 17,
at 406. See also Farina & Ring, The Influence of PerceivedMental Illness on
InterpersonalRelations, 70 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCH. 47 (1965).
115. Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 708.
116. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 96.
117. Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 714.
118. Whether or not a duty of care exists in a particular circumstance is
a legal question. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N.E. 99 (1928).
119. See Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974) (no duty
to guard against "freakish or fantastic" occurrence); Lance v. Senior, 36 Inl.
2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231 (1967) (no duty to prevent a hemophiliac from playing
with a needle).
120. Alternatively, the contractual relationship between the physician
and patient can form the basis for liability when the physician's negligence
is in breach of a contractual duty. See, e.g., Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142,
47 N.W.2d 901 (1951) (complaint stated a cause of action in tort even though
the duty alleged to have been breached arose out of a contractual obligation
to repair plaintiff's porch).
121. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.

1978]

Regulating Medical Psychotherapists

treatment or an aspect of the relationship may harm the patient,
and the greater the harm might be, the greater care the psychotherapist must take.' 22 Thus, a psychiatrist who possesses and
properly applies the basic skills of his profession can exercise
123
varying degrees of care towards individual patients.
Individualized degrees of care have led to the application of
124
various standards for quantifying psychiatric negligence.
This inconsistency may be the result of the judiciary's reluctance "to establish legal standards of care in the murky area
where schools of thought proliferate-and disintegrate-at an
alarming rate."'125 Due to this uncertainty within the science, the
courts have been able to do little more than "outline the extreme limit of acceptable psychotherapeutic treatment."' 126 In
the absence of litigation defining the points within this outer
limit at which the courts will hold a psychotherapist liable, uncertainty over acceptable standards of practice will persist. Yet,
until the practice of psychotherapy becomes more definite, the
courts will not be able to establish narrower standards of care,
and the injured patient will continue to face the prospect of dis27
missal for failure to state a cause of action in his complaint.
Proximate Cause
The literature is rich with studies which indicate that the
exacting science of psychiatry is anything but exact.' 28 In one,
122. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 83.
123. While the standard of care does not vary from case to case, the
measure of care may vary depending on the factors incident to the treatment. Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 701, 703. Of course, where the psychothera-

pist makes use of a new or somewhat novel technique, he must justify that
treatment before the court. Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 1008, affg 105 Sol.
J. 257 (1961).
124. E.g., Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun. 282, 289, 3 N.Y.S. 338, 341 (1888) (ordinary care); McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 268 (1863) (reasonable diligence); Wood v. Clapp, 36 Tenn. 26, 28 (1856) ("reasonable" degree of skill
and care as opposed to "highest" degree); Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257,
affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961) ("very greatest care").
125. Tort Liability, supra note 19, at 409. Dawidoff reports that the

measure of care required depends on the "tractability of the forces being
controlled: their danger, the skill necessary to control them or the interest
at stake." Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 702.

Application of inconsistent standards may also be the result of the judiciary's attempt to acknowledge the limitations of a newly developing science by restricting the formulation of duties for which a psychotherapist
might be held liable, much like the restrictions placed on the level of precision expected in the diagnosis of mental illness. Tarshis, supra note 14, at
78. See also note 65 supra.
126. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 85. See note 150 and accompanying text

infra.

127. See generally PROSSER, supra note 9, at 289.

128. See Medical Malpractice,supra note 18, at 700-02.
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the authors report that, on the average, psychiatrists can be expected to agree only 54% of the time. 129 This uncertainty within

the profession generally is equally applicable to the practice of
psychotherapy. 130 Thus it is likely that a medical psychotherapist who is sued for malpractice will always be able to find colleagues who will testify that the plaintiff's condition was the
result of factors beyond the defendant's control,' 31 and that the
treatment did not proximately cause the damage complained
of. 132 If it can be proven that the plaintiffs injuries did result
from the psychiatrist's tortious conduct, the patient must still
show that a different treatment would not have caused the injury.133 Such a showing will be difficult to make given the underdeveloped state of the science and the reluctance of
psychotherapists to predict the success of any one method of

129. B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 286 (1973).
The authors go on to report that this figure compares unfavorably with the
90% agreement rate among ballistics experts and the 75% agreement rate
among polygraph specialists. The 54% general figure is surprisingly high
when compared with the agreement rate among psychiatrists who relate
psychiatric categories to a patient's present mental condition. See note 141
infra. For a further discussion of agreement rates among psychiatric experts, compare Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom,62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974), with Beck,
Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis:A Critique of Systematic Studies, 119
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 210 (1962) (reviewing the methodology employed by
some researchers who have concluded that psychiatric diagnosis is unreliable).
130. "Numerous studies have demonstrated that psychotherapy is unsuccessful in inducing behavior change, that no form of psychotherapy is
more successful than others, and that patients are either just as likely or
more likely to improve their condition in the course of time without the benefit of psychotherapy." Medical Malpractice, supra note 19, at 706-07.
Contra,Subotnik, Spontaneous Remission:Fact or Artifact, 77 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL.32 (1972).
131. Since the psychotherapeutic relationship works only when both
physician and patient try to interact, the patient's worsened condition may
be the result of his own contributory negligence or peculiar sensitivities. Cf.
401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898) (defendant having no knowlBraun v. Craven, 175 Ill.
edge of plaintiffs particular sensitivities not liable for intentional infliction
of mental distress). Experts may even be justified in testifying that the injury (or some portion of it) was the natural result of the illness itself. Tort
Liability,supra note 19, at 412. This division of responsibility between the
parties would preclude the injured patient from invoking the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. See Kerby v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 28 Ill. App. 2d 259, 171
N.E.2d 412 (1960); Kirchner v. Kuhlman, 334 Ill. App. 339, 79 N.E.2d 628
(1948).
132. In a field "where there is so little agreement on diagnosis and
treatment, it is no mean task to establish the necessary causal chain." Tort
Liability,supra note 19, at 412.
133. Cf. Milano v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 290, 253 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1964) (because there was no showing that Rorschach test would have revealed homicidal tendencies, state mental health authority was not negligent in failing
to predict a homicidal assault by an untested mental patient).

1978]

Regulating Medical Psychotherapists

therapy. l a4
Assessing the Damages
Among the legal burdens imposed on the plaintiff whose
pleadings have survived the demurrer stage in his suit against a
negligent psychotherapist is the requisite showing that a deteri-

orated (or unimproved) mental condition resulted from the psychiatrist's negligent conduct. 1m In other words, proof of
damages is an essential part of the plaintiff's case. 136 However,
because of the unique nature of the psychotherapeutic process,
the assessment of an injured patient's damages may be nearly
impossible. The difficulty encountered by courts when evaluating the symptoms of psychic injury is illustrative of this damage
assessment problem. 37 Unlike other specialty branches where
the damages suffered by the patient are manifestations of the
physician's negligence, symptoms associated with psychic injury may ironically be indicative of the psychotherapist's success. For example, if two years of therapy have done nothing for
the patient except increase his anxiety, a condition which has
caused his loss of employment, the psychiatrist can defend by
showing that what his former patient considers an injury was
really the first sign of progress in unearthing the plaintiff's problem. 3 8 Alternatively, should anxiety decrease, success may be
134. While it is generally agreed that psychotherapy is appropriate
treatment for neurosis, its usefulness in treating schizophrenia, manic depression, and psychosomatic diseases remains uncertain. See Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 705.
135. In Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257, affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961),
the plaintiff recovered for her severe neurosis as well as for the damages
incurred as a result of her inability to work. Normally, the extent of liability
resulting from psychic injury is uncertain, see note 137 and accompanying
text infra, but is more easily measurable when accompanied by bodily injury. See PROSSER, supra note 9, at 330.
136. The importance of proving damages is illustrated by a New York

judge who intimated that where damages are unascertainable, the plaintiff's cause will fail. See Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 484, 223 N.E.2d 343,
345, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 888 (1966) (Keating, J., concurring). But cf. Illinois
Power Co. v. Champaign Asphalt Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 74, 310 N.E.2d 463 (1974)
(damages may be established on the basis of reasonable probability).
137. Mental pain has not always been compensable. See, e.g., Cleveland, C.,C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). In Illinois, mental pain
which results from physical pain is recoverable, Werner v. Illinois Cent. R.
Co., 309 Ill. App. 292, 33 N.E.2d 121 (1941), rev'd. on othergrounds, 379 Ill. 559,
42 N.E.2d 82 (1942), because a neurosis is as much an injury as the loss of a
limb. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 345 Ill. 349, 178 N.E. 187
(1931).
138. Dawidoff reports that:
[Sluch intensity of feelings is not only the mark of some therapeutic
success, but the prelude to insight on the part of the patient. Such a
resurrection of the repressed feelings of childhood allows the intellec-
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claimed for alleviating painful symptoms. Where this temporary but requisite regression is found to constitute sufficient
damage to impose liability, a court would be somewhat reluctant
to "fix liability upon the downside of a curve before its future
1 39
Thus, the valuapath upward has had a chance to emerge."'
tion even of acknowledged damages might prove difficult when
they are transitory in nature. Should the damages be permanent, they may prove difficult to apportion if they are caused in
part by the plaintiffs refusal to seek the additional help necessary for his "turning the corner" in the psychotherapeutic proc14 0
ess.
Problems of Proof
The injured patient willing to bring suit against a negligent
psychiatrist faces serious problems in assembling proof to support his cause of action. 141 Psychotherapy is practiced, for the
most part, in private, with only the therapist and patient present. 142 It is necessary, therefore, to resolve the question of negligence on the basis of the parties' conflicting testimony about
143
what was said and done during the course of the treatment.
tual and emotional examination of feelings not previously understood
or dealt with. Through such re-examination the emotional learning of
psychotherapy occurs.
Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 714. Thus, where some form of regression is to be
expected, it is doubtful that those symptoms which surface constitute adequate damage. See generally Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 705.
139. Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 712.
140. See notes 88, 113 supra. If the negligent psychiatrist is responsible
for his former patient's incredulous disposition, then the patient's refusal to
seek additional help is not in breach of a duty to mitigate damages. Should
the responsibility for his former patient's disposition be traced to an inadequacy in the psychiatrist's initial explanations of what was to be expected
during therapy, the patient may be able to avoid numerous pitfalls by showing lack of informed consent. See Tarshis, supra note 14, at 89. See also
notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
141. The problems of proof are most acute when the plaintiff alleges
diagnostic negligence, for when attempting to relate psychiatric categories
to a patient's present mental condition, the rate of agreement among the
experts was reportedly less than 25%. Goldsmith &Mandell, The Psychodynqmic Formulation:A Critique of a PsychiatricRitual, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1738 (1969). See also Ash, The Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnosiA 44 J.
ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCH. 272, 276 (1949). Thus, "[sIince so much debate and
confusion exists within the profession, it is likely that a psychiatrist who is
sued for negligently choosing or administering a therapy will always be able
to find support from his colleagues for his actions." Medical Malpractice,
supra note 19, at 707.
142. This "private" dimension of psychotherapy also limits the effectiveness of peer control. See Tarshis, supra note 14, at 77.
143. Wise counsel would not allow plaintiff's case to assume the posture of the psychiatrist's word against that of his former patient, for the
psychiatrist would be viewed as more credible by the jury. See note 114 and
accompanying text supra.
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Records of sessions kept by the psychotherapist may help bolster the patient's quantum of proof, and sloppy or incomplete
records will weigh heavily against the therapist.'" However, the
sufficiency of detail in these records will be judged in light of the
standard in the community, 145 which may be difficult to ascertain given the general reluctance of physicians to testify in malpractice actions. 46 When a general standard can be established
on the basis of learned treatises, professional journal articles, or
association guidelines, the same "conspiracy of silence" will
hamper the plaintiff's showing that the defendant's records
were inadequate when viewed against a specific standard, the
terms of which are defined by the pecularities of his particular
treatment. 147 Of course, even where complete records show
deviation from some standard practice in the relevant psychiatric community, the psychiatrist will seek to justify the treatment
by characterizing it as acceptable to a "respected minority" of
the profession. 14 "[S]ince psychiatry is one field where the
traditional, conservative approach has been repudiated by many
practitioners,"' 49 the psychotherapist will encounter little difficulty in legitimizing all but the most extraordinary forms of
treatment, 5 0 particularly when the therapy has been successful
144. Slawson, Psychiatric Malpractice: A Regional Incidence Study,
126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1302, 1305 (1970).
145. See Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 701, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486, 495-96
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
146. See Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HARv. L. REV.
333, 336-38 (1963). 'The reluctance of the members of the medical profession
to testify against a fellow disciple of Aesculapius makes the search for a
medical expert very difficult in most cases and well nigh impossible in
some cases." Sanders v. Frost, 112 Ill. App. 2d 234, 241, 251 N.E.2d 105, 108
(1969).
147. It might be argued that once the plaintiff shows any deviation
from established recordkeeping practices, it is incumbent upon the psychiatrist to come forth with an adequate explanation. See Tort Liability,supra
note 19, at 419-20.
148. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 163.

It is, in fact, unlikely that a psychiatrist could be held liable for negligently choosing a method of psychotherapy, since such a large number
Therefore, even if a patient were able to
of possible therapies exist ....
introduce expert testimony at trial to show that the therapy was inappropriate, the psychiatrist would be able to counter this testimony with
experts of his own.
Medical Malpractice,supra note 19, at 705.
149. Tort Liability, supra note 19, at 419.
150. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1976) (sexual psychotherapy); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1969) (intentional mismanagement of transfer phenomenon in order to commit fraud); Hammer v.
Rosen, 7 App. Div. 2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1959), modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165
N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960) (therapy bordering on assault and battery).
In Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257, affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961), the
psychotherapist who had initiated social contacts with his patient was
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5
in the past.' '

Thus, despite the conceptual ease with which one can illus-

trate various forms of psychotherapeutic malpractice, recovery
for all but the most outrageous conduct on the part of the therapist is unlikely. Duties of the psychotherapist are difficult to formulate. Injuries are hard to identify and difficult to trace to the
responsible psychiatrist. If a causal connection can be made,
damages may prove unmeasurable. Yet, the tort sanction is only
one of three methods used by society to inhibit professional
dereliction. Perhaps the state's certification process or the selfregulatory action of the psychiatric community can be used to
minimize the risk of psychotherapeutic malpractice.
REGULATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS
The Existing Controls
Negligent psychotherapists are a legitimate public concern.15 2 Given the potentiality for abuse, there is little doubt
that statutes providing for the regulation of psychotherapists
can be grounded in the Constitution 153 and, the states' police
found guilty of negligence, but only because there was no proof offered into
evidence which showed acceptance of this type of treatment by a respected
minority of his peers. See Dawidoff, supra note 7, at 715, wherein the author
refers to this case as an "accident of proof."
151. See Tarshis, supra note 14, at 85, where the author notes that
"success is the best justification for unestablished treatment." In view of
the manner in which ordinarily adverse symptoms can be characterized as
favorable, see note 138 and accompanying text supra, a showing of successful results in the past would seem to pose little difficulty. Yet the use of
some novel techniques which have succeeded in cases where more established methods have failed still may result in liability for the innovative
therapist. See Hammer v. Rosen, 7 App. Div. 2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1959),
modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960) (physical beatings made out a primafaciecase of malpractice despite evidence elicited at
the trial court that schizophrenic patient, who had undergone radical psychiatric care at various institutions without success, was initially aided by
the beatings).
152. See note 6 supra.
153. Included within a citizen's constitutional right to liberty and the
pursuit of happiness is his right to pursue the calling of his choice. Frazer v.
Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 150 N.E. 696 (1926); People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N.E.
809 (1921). However, the citizen's occupational prerogative is subordinate to
the right of the state to impose such reasonable restrictions and regulations
on that field as may be necessary to protect the public interest. Bessette v.
People, 193 11. 334,62 N.E. 215 (1901). Thus, where the character or extent of
operation of an enterprise causes it to affect other persons or their property,
the state can impose conditions on entry into the field, and may prescribe
terms under which the calling may be pursued. Chicago v. R. &X. Restaurant, 369 IlM. 65, 15 N.E.2d 725 (1938). In this regard, the Constitution offers
no protection to one who conducts his business in disregard for the public
health, safety or morals. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Broadnax
v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285 (1911).
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power.'l 4 Of course, regulation of psychotherapy, designed to
inhibit negligent practice generally, should include all practitioners whether medical or non-medical personnel. In addition
to formal state regulations governing those who practice psychotherapy, there are professional associations which possess regulatory and disciplinary powers over their membership. Their
principal powers are certification of members and accreditation
of training programs in which members receive their professional education.
Role of the State
Non-Medical Practitioners
Psychiatrists are not alone in the practice of psychotherapy
but share the discipline with non-medical practitioners. Psychologists, 155 armed with either a masters or doctoral degree in
psychology, advise and counsel clients on matters of mental
health and treat their mental illness. During the course of this
156
treatment, psychologists may practice psychotherapy.
Recognizing the danger to the health and welfare of its citizens which results from the rendition of psychological services
by unskilled psychologists, many states have passed legislation
providing for the licensing or certification of practitioners of
psychology. 157 The courts generally have found these statutes
to be within the states' police powers and have upheld those rea-

154. The states are charged with the responsibility of protecting the
general welfare and thus it is within their police power to regulate the practice of medicine and any of its related branches. E.g., Mann v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 31 Cal. 2d 30, 187 P.2d 1 (1947). State regulation is justified because the practice of medicine requires special skills and qualifications that the public is generally unable to acquire. See People v. Witte, 315
Il1. 282, 146 N.E. 178 (1925). Apparently, this right of the public to preserve
professionalism within medical ranks and to protect itself from incompetence was recognized as early as the Code of Hammurabi. See Hughes v.
State Medical Examiners, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S.E. 42 (1926).
A limitation on this power is that the regulations must bear a reasonable relation to the public welfare and cannot be arbitrary. State v. Borah,
51 Ariz. 318, 76 P.2d 757 (1938); Lowman v. Kuecker, 246 Iowa 1227, 71 N.W.2d
586 (1955). Those regulations found to be both necessary and appropriate
are proper exercises of the state's plenary power and as such, violate no
constitutional rights of liberty or property, Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wash.
146, 259 P. 17 (1927), nor any privilege or immunity of national citizenship.
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
155. See note 14 supra.
156. See H. LIEBENSON & J. WEPMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGIST As A WITNESS
81 (1964).

See also W. VANHooSE & J. KOTTLER, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES

IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 109-11 (1977)

(approximately 10,000

psychologists practice psychotherapy).
157. Forty-seven states have statutes regulating the practice of psychology. W. VANHOOSE & J. KOTTLER, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

121 (1977).
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58
sonably calculated to achieve a legitimate public interest goal.

Psychologists practicing' 5 9 in Illinois are regulated through

the Psychologist Registration Act. 160 The Act regulates persons
holding themselves out as "psychologists"'16 1 and those rendering "psychological services"' 62 by prohibiting the use of the title
163
and rendition of the services by persons without a certificate.
The Act further requires that before a certificate can be issued
the applicant must have received a doctoral degree in psychology from an approved institution, 6 4 completed two years of satisfactory professional experience, 165 and passed the Department
of Registration and Education's examination. 166 Usually, only a
fee is required for renewal, reinstatement or restoration of a certificate, 167 however, "where the circumstances so indicate," the
Department may require an examination prior to restoring any
certificate of registration. 168 Grounds for refusal or revocation of
a practitioner's certificate generally reflect a concern for either
the applicant's moral turpitude or his mental health. 169 The
penalty for violating the Act is a Class B misdemeanor for the
first offense 170 and a Class A misdemeanor for second and subsequent violations. 171 Since the Act defines unlawful practice as
a public nuisance, 172 uncertified practitioners can be enjoined
from performing such unlawful acts and can be held in contempt
158. See, e.g., Pitts v. State Board of Examiners, 222 Md. 224, 160 A.2d

200 (1960); National Psychological Ass'n v. Univ. of N.Y., 8 N.Y.2d 197, 168

N.E.2d 649, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 298 (1960).
159. The practice of psychology is defined in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, §
5304 (1977).

160. Id.§ 5301 (1977).
161.
A person represents himself to be a "psychologist" within the meaning
of this Act when he holds himself out to the public by any title or
description of services incorporating the words "psychological," "psychologic," "psychologist," or "psychology," and under such title or
description offers to render or renders services to individuals, corporations or the public for remuneration.
Id.§ 5302(5) (1977).
162. "'Psychological services' refers to any services if the words 'psychological,' 'psychologic,' or 'psychology' are used to describe such services
by the person or organization offering to render or rendering them." Id. §

5302(6) (1977).
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.§ 5303 (1977).
Id.§ 5311(d) (1977).
Id.§ 5311(e) (1977).
Id.§ 5311(f) (1977).
Id.§ 5315 (1977).
Id.

169. Id. § 5316(1) to (7) (1977).

170. Id.§ 5326 (1977).
171. Id.
172. Id.§ 5327 (1977).
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173
of court for violating the injunction.

Medical Practitioners
174
Since the general practice of medicine is a qualified right,
the state may regulate branches of the medical art and prescribe
rules and regulations for those practicing in a medical speciality. 175 Presumably, then, a state has the right to regulate persons who hold themselves out as "psychiatrists," or those who
render "psychiatric services" the same as psychologists. Howdespite the functional
ever, no such regulation exists in Illinois
176
overlap of psychiatry with psychology.
177
Illinois has defined "psychiatrist" in a number of ways,
178
"who devotes a substanbut all commonly refer to a physician
tial portion of his time to the practice of psychiatry.' 79 Time in
80
and spepractice requirements are found in several statutes,
adminseeking
psychiatrists
for
cial qualifications are required

173. Id.
174. At common law, the right was unqualified and the practice of
medicine open to all with the only check on incompetency being the tort
sanction. See generally State v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P.2d 757 (1938); Vest
v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953).
175. Barsky v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442 (1954). Among the
related branches regulated in Illinois are dental surgery, nursing, optometry, pharmacy, physical therapy, and veterinary medicine. See generally
ILL.REV. STAT. ch. 111, §§ 2202, 3401, 3801, 4001, 4201, 6901 (1977).
176. "Psychiatry ... is by and large, in its function and its subject matter, nearly identical to the field of clinical psychology ... ." with the only
difference being that the psychiatrist can prescribe drugs and shock therapy while the psychologist cannot. J. ZISKIN, COPING WrrH PSYCHIATRIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 259 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as ZisKIN]. One author reports that psychiatrists have become quite dependent
on psychologists for valuable and almost indispensable diagnostic services
without which no formulation of the personality problems of the patient
would be complete. Kirkpatrick, TrainingFor Psychotherapy with Special
Reference to Non-Medical Fields, 19 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHATRY 1, 3 (1949).
177. See notes 178-81 and accompanying text infra.
178. " 'Physician,' means any person licensed by the State of Illinois to
practice medicine in all its branches, and includes any person holding a
State Hospital Permit or Temporary Certificate of Registration, as provided
§ 1-14 (1977).
in the Medical Practice Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2,
179. This language is found in the Mental Health Code, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 , § 1-15 (1977), as well as the statute which defines the psychiatristpatient relationship and the evidentiary privilege resulting therefrom. ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-4.01 (1977)
and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2403 (1977) (reputable physician who specializes in the diagnosis and treatment of mental and nervous disorders).
180. One year in practice is required of the certifying psychiatrist immediately preceeding his certification of any patient in commitment proceedings. ILL.REV. STAT. ch. 911/, § 1-15 (1977) and five years in practice is
required for psychiatrists appointed by a court to examine sexually dangerous persons. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-4 (1977) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §
2403 (1977).
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istrative positions in state departments.' 8 ' But for the physician
who seeks to enter private psychiatric practice and specialize in
psychotherapy, nothing beyond a medical license is required by
the State of Illinois.
Internal Control of Psychiatrists
Primary control of the practice of psychotherapy by psychi8 2
atrists comes from within the psychiatric community itself.'
183
the speThe American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology,
cialty organization of the American Psychiatric Association,
controls the certification in psychiatry of licensed physicians,
while the Joint Residency Review Committee sets the academic
requirements for medical students who enter a certified psychiatric practice after graduation. 184 The American Board of
Psychiatry and Neurology maintains strict certification requirements including three years of specialty training in an accredprogram and two years of postited psychiatric training
residency experience. 8 5 This insures that certified practitioners
exhibit an advanced proficiency in the diagnosis and treatment
of mental diseases. Presumably, this expertise sets them apart
from their collegues whose minimal exposure to the mental
186
healing arts came during their basic medical school training.
REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 7.07 (1977).
182. Tarshis, supra note 14, at 76.
Hospital by-laws and peer review panels can provide some informal
control over its staff psychiatrists, see Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1965), however, "peer control can only have limited effectiveness, since the
psychotherapist's professional activity takes place in the privacy of his interviews, in which none of his peers participates." Tarshis, supra note 14, at
77.
It might be argued the complaints and discipline committees of psychiatric associations constitute a primary source of control over the practice
of psychiatry, however, professional misconduct is not necessarily negligence but perhaps only unethical practice. See Tarshis, supra note 14, at 76.
Of course, that ethical and professional conduct is no defense to a malpractice suit was made clear in Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257, 258, aff'd, 105
Sol. J. 1008 (1961). See text accompanying note 44 supra.
183. For an interesting discussion of the background, history and function of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, see Freeman,
Ebaugh & Boyd, The Founding of the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology, Inc., 115 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 769 (1959).
184. Taylor & Torrey, The Pseudo-Regulationof American Psychiatry,
129 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 658, 659 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Taylor &Torrey].
The substance of Taylor & Torrey's critical article was reaffirmed in W.

181. ILL.

VANHOOSE & J. KOTrLER, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN COUNSELING AND

PSYCHOTHERAPY 114-16 (1977).

185. Taylor & Torrey, supra note 184, at 659.
186. Medical students study the basic sciences such as bio-chemistry,
anatomy, pharmacology, and physiology and receive clinical training and
experience in surgery, internal medicine, pediatrics, gynecology and obstet-
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The regulatory mechanism of the Joint Residency Review Committee is more basic than that of the Board. By controlling the
accreditation of psychiatric training programs in the medical
schools, the Committee insures its direct and immediate role in
the education of psychiatric residents by "regulating" the size of
the medical staff, the hours of supervision, the number of patients in the hospital, and the number of volumes in the li18 7
brary.
While the Board and the Committee are charged with the
primary responsibility of insuring that psychiatrists are competent, both are said to operate with a "structural bias that has a
way of changing regulation into protectionism.' 88 A brief examination of the certification and accreditation processes will illuminate this criticism.
Certificationof Psychiatrists
Psychiatrists enjoy voluntary certification. 8 9 As a result,
approximately two-thirds of all psychiatrists practice in America
without Board certification. 190 This is not to say, however, that
"premature" practice of psychiatry is the norm. On the contrary,
98% of all "self-designated" psychiatrists have entered a residency training program. 19 1 However, only 58% registered for the
written examination of the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology. 192 An extension of these figures show that if all who
registered actually take the Board's certification examination,
then approximately 20% of those tested are practicing psychiarics, neurology, developmental psychology, psychiatry and other areas of
medical practice. ZISKIN, supra note 176, at 275.

187. Taylor &Torrey, supra note 184, at 661.
188. Id. at 658. But see Frazier, A Commentary on "The Pseudo-Regulation of American Psychiatry", 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 664 (1972). This structural bias has lead one author to suggest that the Board review its goals and

functions in order to maintain a higher degree of professional competence

among practicing psychiatrists. Morganstern, A Criticism of Psychiatry's
Board of Examiners, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 33 (1970).
189. Taylor &Torrey, supra note 184, at 658.
190. Id. This figure compares with the following specialty board rates:
surgery (89%), pediatrics (87%), internal medicine (61%). Levit, Sabshin &
Mueller, Trends in Graduate Medical Education and Specialty
Certification,290 N. ENG. J. MED. 545-49 (1974).
191. Levit, Sabshin & Mueller, Trends in GraduateMedical Education
and Specialty Certification, 290 N. ENG. J. MED. 545-49 (1974). Conversely,

two percent have had no specialty training of any kind.
The authors note that the percentage of psychiatrists entering training
programs compares favorably with other medical specialities, e.g., surgery
(96%), pediatrics (91%), and internal medicine (84%).
192. Id. For a lesson on the options available to those wishing to take
the Board examination, see Patterson, How to Avoid Taking the Boards but
Save Face, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 79 (1975).
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try after receiving a failing grade in the test that presumably
19 3
measures professional expertise.
Ancillary to the problem of voluntary certification is the absence of a recertification process.1 94 Currently, "a man could
pass the Board examination at age 31, enter the field of engineering for the next 30 years, and return to psychiatry at age 61
as a full-fledged, Board-certified psychiatrist."'1 95 When one considers the dramatic changes that have occurred over the last 20
years in drug therapy alone, 196 the dangers posed by lack of periodic recertification become evident.
Accreditation of Psychiatric Training Programs
The second vehicle through which the psychiatric profession regulates its membership is the Joint Residency Review
Committee which controls the curriculum offered to the psychiatrist during residency training. 197 If the psychiatric residency
program offered is satisfactory, the school is accredited and becomes eligible to send its graduates to the American Board of
Psychiatry and Neurology certification examination. 198
Little is known about the mechanics of this review committee because its semi-annual meetings are held in secret. 199 Most
unusual, however, is the lack of evidence to substantiate the effectiveness of the criteria used by the Review Committee in accrediting residency programs. No statistical correlation has been
made to determine the strength of the accrediting criteria with
the competence of those who have undergone advanced psychi200
atric training at schools accredited by the Review Committee.
This lack of supportive data is due to the absence of specialty
orientations within accredited residency programs. Apart from
time spent studying electives, psychiatrists planning on careers
in research receive the same training as psychiatric consultants
to industry. 20 1 Since subspecialists are trained in like fashion, it
193. Even a passing score on the examination does not allay the suspicion in some minds because the Board has failed to establish "performance
criteria that correlate with psychiatric competence," thus rendering the test
a less than meaningful basis for certification. Taylor & Torrey, supra note

184, at 659.
194. Taylor & Torrey, supra note 184, at 659.

195. Id.
196. See generally LAWYERS'

MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, MALPRACTICE AND
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS INVOLVING DRuGS(1976).

197. Taylor & Torrey, supra note 184, at 660.

198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 659, 660.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 659.
Also receiving the same training are "future community psychia-
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would be difficult to measure how the training influences the
psychiatrist's general competence.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Formal regulation of psychiatrists who practice psychotherapy in Illinois is currently inadequate to insure an acceptable

level of professional competence. 20 2 Presently in Illinois, any licensed physician may practice psychiatry, including psychotherapy, since no additional training or demonstrable
proficiency in psychiatry is required.20 3 The reluctance of the
psychiatric community to police its own ranks is illustrated by
the absence of mandatory certification or periodic recertification 2° 4 and the uniform training programs offered all psychiatric residents regardless of their subspeciality. Yet, the more
complex the activity of a professional group, the more society
trists, behavioral researchers, psychotherapists, mental health administrators and psychiatric educators ... ." Id.
202. The magnitude of the problem in Illinois was illustrated in an
early 1977 news article which reported that "half of the psychiatrists employed by the Illinois Department of Mental Health ... flunked a special
medical-licensing examination. . . ." The test was
[M]ade up of questions on psychiatry, neurology and internal medicine
taken from a national medical-licensing exam administrated in every
state. To make the special Illinois exam easier, the [Registration and
Education Department] included only questions that 92 percent of doctors taking the complete test recently had got correct .... Passing
scores for the two main sections of the test were about 520 of 800 possible points. According to the official sheets for the test [the grades were
tabulated by the respected National Board of Medical Examiners] ...
the 127 doctors Iwho flunked] averaged only 227.4 and 244.8 points. The
majority of them scored far less than half the number of points required.
The Illinois Mental Health Agency employs about 330 psychiatrists,
but many are engaged in private practice and work for the state on a parttime basis. Chicago Sunday Sun-Times, Feb. 27, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
203. Apparently, this training and field demonstration of competence is
thought by some experts to be important since both are now a part of the
Board of Psychiatry and Neurology certification requirement. See note 185
and accompanying text supra. Similar mandatory requirements are imposed on the "nearly identical" field of psychology. See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
However, applicants for the Board's certification examination having
"two years of training in any medical or surgical specialty may substitute
this experience for a year of psychiatric experience. This means that two
years of training in colon and rectal surgery may count as a year of experience in psychiatry." W. VANHOOSE & J. KOTTLER, ETHIcAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 115 (1977).
204. One author addressing this point notes that "[a]lthough certification, as distinguished from licensure, is not a legal requirement to practice a
specialty, it does infer a willingness to be evaluated by one's peers on matters of clinical safety and competence." Small, RecertificationFor Psychiatrists: The Time to Act is Now, 132 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 291, 292 (1975).
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must depend on the group to regulate itself.205 Therefore, some

catalyst (other than the illusory threat of a tort sanction) will
have to motivate the psychiatric community to take a more active and meaningful role in the production of qualified psychiatrists if a public oriented system of professional regulation is to
be achieved.
The Illinois Psychologists Registration Act has had this catalytic effect on those rendering psychological services, 206 and so
might similar legislation which vests mandatory specialty certification authority for psychiatrists with either the American
Board of Psychiatry and Neurology or another similarly situated
public panel. Despite arguments to the contrary, 207 a "Psychiatrist Registration Act" would seem to be as valid an exercise of
Illinois' police power as the Psychologists Registration Act
which regulates the "nearly identical" field of psychology. 20 8 Indeed, since psychiatrists have become quite dependent on psychologists for indispensable diagnostic services, 209 it would be
inconsistent for the state to insist on a higher level of competence for the assisting psychologist than for the referring psychiatrist.
Besides being a necessary exercise of the state's police
power, registration would be both reasonable and appropriate.
205. The inability of patients to evalute the qualifications of physicians
on an individual basis necessitates the licensing process. See People v.
Witte, 315 Ill. 282, 146 N.E. 178 (1925). Yet, presumably, government is in no
better position to pass judgment on individual practitioners. It follows, then,
that after the legislature decides to invoke its police power to license members of a, professional group, the licensing power should be passed to
respected members of that profession who would proscribe qualifications to
be met before a license is granted. See Barron, Business and Professional
Licensing-California,A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 649
(1965).
206. Beginning in 1953, the American Psychological Association developed standards for training psychologists which were used as guidelines for
certification and licensure laws enacted in many states during the 1950s and
1960s. In later years, the more comprehensive and definitive standards
which emerged to stabilize the qualifications and functions of psychologists
had considerable impact on the educational institutions that members, by
statute, were required to attend. See generally W. VANHoOSE & J. KO'rLER,
ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 109-14
(1977).
207. Frazier, Commentary on "The Pseudo-Regulation of American
Psychiatry," 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 664, 666 (1972) ("it seems abundantly
clear to those in the area of civil liberties that the individual rights of citizens and physicians, as well as the right of the individual states to grant
licensure for practice, would stand in the way [of mandatory certificationi ").
208. See notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra. See also Rios v.
Jones, 63 Ill. 2d 488, 348 N.E.2d 825 (1976) (the states' interest in promoting
the general welfare by licensing physicians is of great importance).
209. See note 176 and accompanying text supra.
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Regulating Medical Psychotherapists

In the past, neglect of the Board of Psychiatry and Neurology
concerning the certification process has been defended on the
ground that the Board had no authority to act,2 10 a position that
has not been without its critics. 21' By formalizing the certification requirement through legislation, the state can utilize an authoritative board of medical personnel, academicians, and
representatives of the public to better insure quality psychotherapeutic practice. This legislation would have the additional
effect of centralizing the responsibility for patient care through
improvement in the psychiatrist's medical school training. 21 2 As
officers of the state, Board members would have the authority to
insure that "deficient" professionals enroll in various educational programs conducted by peer review committees, 2 13 and
would be better able to exercise the authority since their liveli2 14
hood would not depend on the marketplace.
Admittedly, mandatory certification for psychiatrists is no
panacea. It will not eliminate negligence within the psychotherapeutic relationship. However, it will insure that psychiatrists
are at least minimally qualified to practice psychotherapy. Since
it is unlikely that the judiciary can adequately redress a patient
injured while undergoing psychotherapy, the legislature must
demand that a psychiatrist have minimal qualifications in order
to reduce the risk of the injury ever occurring.
CONCLUSION

The unique nature of psychotherapy raises special
problems for an injured patient who sues his psychiatrist for
malpractice. Authors addressing the problems have intimated
210. See Frazier, A Commentary on "The Pseudo-Regulationof American Psychiatry," 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 664, 666 (1972).
211. See Morganstern, A Criticism of Psychiatry's Board of
Examiners, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 33 (1970) (wherein the author suggests

that it may be necessary to re-examine the functions and goals of the
Board).

212. This improvement in the educational process is especially important in light of a study which has shown that a college student whose only
exposure to formal psychology was a 17 hour program of study, could get a
higher grade on an exam in psychiatry than medical students who received
a minimum of 250 hours of classroom instruction in psychiatry. Pierce,
Mathis & Pishkin, Basic Psychiatry in Twelve Hours: An Experiment in
ProgrammedLearning,29 DISEASES NERVOUS SYs. 533-35 (1968). This result
is consistent with the sentiments of one psychiatrist who stated that his

medical school education was irrelevant to the work that he does. Mariner,
A Critical Look at Professional Education in the Mental Health Field, 22
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 271, 274 (1967).

213. See Newman &Luft, The Peer Review Process: Education versus
Control, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1363-85 (1974).
214. See Barron, Business and Professional Licensing--California,A
Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 644 (1966).
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that as the science becomes more defined, the resulting increase
of litigation will help define standards for psychotherapeutic
care which will accommodate both the capabilities of the psychiatrist and society's need to protect its citizens from negligent
treatment. 2 15 Yet, if the nature of the psychotherapeutic relationship renders the tort option a functional impossibility in all
but the most extreme circumstances, the case law will remain
stagnant. If the tort alternative is unavailable, other sources of
professional regulation must be re-evaluated. 216 Mandatory certification will serve to minimize the malpractice threat by insuring a high level of professional competence among psychiatrists
through minimum training and field practice. 217 Until such time
as the legislature moves in this direction, the psychiatric regulatory scheme will be in a state of imbalance.
Michael J. Karson

215. See Tarshis, supra note 14, at 96.
216. This assumes that it is undesirable to upgrade the standard of care
to one of strict liability in order to strengthen the tort option against those
who wished to practice in a still-developing field. See Tarshis, supra note
14, at 83.
217. Greater peer review among medical psychotherapists could facilitate the same goals. See, e.g., Langsley, Peer Review: Prospects and
Problems, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 301 (1973)..Yet, inadequate records, lack of
agreement on diagnosis, and the limited usefulness of psychiatric diagnosis
make peer review in psychiatry very difficult. Liptzin, Quality Assurance
and Psychiatric Practice:A Review, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1374 (1974).
However, the difficulty with "self-policing" may not be impossible to overcome given adequate statistics and follow-up studies. Cf. Schmideberg, The
Promise of Psychiatry:Hopes and Disillusionment,57 Nw. U.L. REV. 19, 21
(1962) (adequate statistics and follow-up studies are regarded by other
medical doctors as their "scientific duty").

